

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

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17	SA/IA				
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19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	SOVA/DD		X		
21	NTD/GPE		X		
22	C/ACIS		X		
SUSPENSE					

Remarks

Executive Secretary

11 January 1984

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Executive Registry

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January 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col (P) John Stanford
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

Dr. Alton Keel
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United States
Representative to the United
Nations

BG George A. Joulwan
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ambassador Morton Abramowitz
Chief Negotiator
Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) -- Friday,
January 13, 1984 (C)

Attached is an interagency discussion paper providing an Overview of MBFR
Options for use at the National Security Council meeting to be held in the
White House Cabinet Room on Friday, January 13, 1984, at 11:00 a.m. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment as Noted

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Overview of MBFR Options

In his decisions of October 14 and October 29, 1983, the President directed that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, working with the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on NATO Conventional Forces and Arms Control, review alternative MBFR options and possible negotiating strategies for the future. The attached papers, which include fleshed-out options and a revised verification annex, respond to this tasking.

Status of the Negotiations

The President has decided that US policy for the current MBFR negotiations is that both a data agreement and a comprehensive NATO verification package are essential prerequisites for a treaty signature and for any initial US-Soviet reductions.

During the current negotiating round in Vienna, the West has continued to press its approach to reductions, verification and data. The West has explained its rationale and has proposed possible modalities for focusing further discussion on verification in order to make progress where such progress is possible.

The East has pressed hard for a "constructive" Western response to the draft treaty it tabled in Vienna on June 23, 1983, and to its earlier proposals of February 17, 1983 calling for US/Soviet mutual example reductions, a freeze, and reductions to parity without prior data agreement. The Western Ad Hoc Group assessment of the Eastern draft treaty states, "On balance the draft moves the East somewhat closer to the Western concept of an MBFR agreement, especially with regard to verifiable parity. However, the draft does not provide assurances that the East will actually take the asymmetrical reductions needed to reach parity, and its proposed verification measures are still inadequate."

On October 25, in an unexpected move, Eastern representatives presented a significant modification in their position by proposing that the sides exchange plans for inviting observers to the reductions of the most significant contingents and include in the plans information on the numerical strength, nationality, designation and location of those contingents. This proposal modifies the East's earlier opposition to any numerically specified reductions to equal levels and to any real numerical verification of those reductions. This new Eastern position ensures that observation of reductions will take place on a predictable basis and not solely at the invitation of the reducing side.

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Having made those moves, the East has taken the position that any further moves are now up to the West, and the East will take no more initiatives in the absence of a Western response. Soviet representatives have taken the same position in bilateral discussions with us regarding the US probe on verification which was launched in June.

A recent delegation assessment of the current situation in the negotiations makes the following points: "In looking at the new Eastern position, we should consider whether we can take advantage of the opportunities provided by these concessions to bring the East still further towards US MBFR objectives. For example, the East's willingness to specify the 'bulk' of reductions could provide an opening to introduce specific numbers -- which the Soviets have been resisting for years -- into the reduction and monitoring process. Eastern moves on verification provide possibilities for pinning down the Soviets more firmly on an effective verification system in MBFR.

"Actually taking advantage of these opportunities is another question. Eastern representatives have told us that having presented these new proposals and having answered Western questions, they will make no further moves in the absence of a Western counterproposal. While this position could change, it seems to us unlikely to do so for some time."

The delegation has also called attention, as has USNATO, to growing differences among the Allies on MBFR negotiating policy. The delegation assessment states, "As we perceive it from here, the Germans, Dutch, Canadians and Nordics feel that the US and UK are too rigid and are assuming too defensive a posture in this negotiation. They are also concerned that the East has substantially enhanced its posture not only in the MBFR negotiations but publicly, and that this could diminish the credibility of the West's overall arms control posture in Western public opinion. These Allies are looking to the US for a lead and to NATO for a new position. While this has not yet become a major issue, it is percolating at senior government levels, particularly in Canada (Trudeau's Guelph speech), the Netherlands, and Germany..... It also appears likely that the Alliance posture on MBFR will be raised at the NATO-Ministerial meeting."

In addition, Chancellor Kohl has written to the President, pleading for a new Western initiative in the negotiations along the lines of the FRG approach.

Options

Against this background, the MBFR IG has examined a range of options, which are briefly summarized below. As a benchmark for comparison, the current Western position in MBFR is summarized first.

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Common to all the options is the need, following a US decision, to coordinate our position first with the UK and FRG trilaterally, then with the other Allies in NATO.

All options are compatible with further work on associated measures including an enhanced Measure 6 on exchange of information, which the delegation proposed in connection with Option Three.

Current Position

The current Western position, embodied in the draft treaty tabled on July 8, 1982, envisages the following sequence of steps:

- Agree on data (i.e., current totals for NATO and Warsaw Pact military manpower in Central Europe).

- Agree on size of reductions to parity, at about 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground and air personnel combined, on each side.

- Agree on verification measures (a package of seven verification and confidence-building measures is contained in Annex II to the Western draft treaty).

- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.

- Implement verification measures and reductions.

- US reduces 13,000 ground personnel in first stage; USSR reduces 30,000.

- All direct participants reduce in three subsequent stages.

- Reductions to be completed within seven years.

Option One: Retain the current approach requiring agreement on data and a verification package as prerequisites for treaty signature and initial US-Soviet reductions.

Under this option a short-term and a long-term approach are suggested. Both essentially retain the principles of the current approach as defined by its sequence of steps. The longer-term approach, however, suggests fundamental modifications to elements of our MBFR position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive study of its ramifications. The short-term proposal is designed to press the East for further movement on verification and to serve as a response to the latest Eastern proposals, while avoiding conflict with longer-range possibilities.

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Near-term Proposals

Alternatives under this approach all require redrafting the current verification annex to the West's draft treaty, especially improving our exchange of information measure, but accepting part of the East's language for other measures where possible. Alternative presentations follow:

-- present new draft verification annex (this would respond to Eastern claim that we have not modified our position since 1979, but would risk rejection of the whole based on reference to unacceptable parts);

-- present modified elements of the annex (this would prolong discussion and perhaps provide more negotiating flexibility to engage the East in discussion of modalities of specific measures);

-- propose a joint drafting exercise on verification provisions (this would probably appear to be the most positive form of response and might elicit greater movement by the East, but might be taken by some as a signal that the sides were much closer than they are).

Longer-term Proposals

The following proposals require study for possible adoption in the long-term:

-- change from manpower to force structure (or other unit of account) in our data discussion and for specification of reductions and limitations;

-- modify our position on exceptions to the ceilings for exercise purposes;

-- modify our position on the reduction of armaments;

-- examine the staging of reductions, including consideration of more significant initial reductions, reaching parity quicker, and possible inclusion of other non-indigenous forces in initial reductions;

-- agree with Allies prior to treaty signature on a set of graduated, automatic responses to low-level warning events.

Option Two: Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature, but before reductions; then reduce to parity

This option envisages the following sequence:

-- Agree on parity goal.

- Agree on verification measures proposed by the West.
- Sign and ratify MBFR treaty.
- Implement the verification measures.
- Agree on data.
- Agree on size of reductions to parity.
- Implement reductions in stages, with verification of residual levels following each stage.

Option Three: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions (Delegation option)

This option envisages the following sequence:

(1) Agree on verification measures proposed by West, including format for the exchange of information (Associated Measure 6), and on sequence for reductions and implementing verification measures.

(2) Agree on an interim agreement of 30 months' duration containing the following points:

-- Initial US-Soviet reductions of 13,000-30,000 with exit/entry points, to be completed with 12 months.

-- Following these reductions, a non-increase commitment on collective level of each side's manpower for period of 18 months.

-- At beginning of freeze, sides would provide information on forces according to Associated Measure 6 format, and would implement all verification measures to confirm information.

-- After 18-month freeze, if sides satisfied that force data/information provided was accurate, sides would proceed to sign and ratify formal treaty covering reductions to parity in three years, with amount of each side's reductions specified in treaty based on the agreed data and with all verification measures in effect from outset. If sides not satisfied that data/information is correct, all obligations would be voided.

(3) Sign and implement this interim agreement (initial reductions and freeze).

(4) Continue negotiations on draft treaty.

(5) If data agreement reached by end of 18-month freeze period, sign and ratify treaty on reductions to parity in 3 years.

(6) Implement treaty reductions to parity.

EG Option: Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet reductions on basis of mutual example.

This option envisages the following sequence:

-- US and USSR agree on size of initial US-Soviet reductions, and withdraw them on basis of mutual example, through designated permanent exit/entry points.

-- Following these reductions, the sides would enter into numerically specified commitments not to increase collective level of manpower, based either on agreed data or on no-agreed data provided by each side provided agreement reached on all verification measures proposed by West. Duration of this commitment limited to specified time.

-- If sides satisfied that data agreement has been reached, sides would sign and ratify a treaty on reductions to parity, with reductions specified based on the agreed data, along lines of current Western draft treaty.

OR Option: Postpone data agreement until after large US-Soviet phase I reductions.

This option envisages the following sequence:

-- Agree on size of "minimum" US (e.g., 25,000) and Soviet (e.g., 60,000) reductions.

-- Agree on residual ceilings for US (about 200,000) and USSR (about 400,000).

-- Agree on verification measures West has proposed.

-- Sign and ratify agreement.

-- Implement these reductions and verification measures.

-- Agreement that these ceilings had been reached would provide agreed data base.

-- All direct participants would enter into "mutual political commitment" not to take actions which would undermine the objective of parity, for fixed duration, during which agreement might be reached on data and the process for reductions to parity.

-- If agreement reached on data, sign and ratify and implement treaty on reductions to parity, similar to Western draft treaty.

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**UNTIL AFTER TREATY SIGNATURE, BUT BEFORE REDUCTIONS;
THEN REDUCTIONS TO PARITY**

I. Description of Option

This option is would establish a sequence of: treaty signature, verification, data agreement, then reduction in stages, with further verification and agreement on force levels before each stage. Its rationale is that it would: (i) answer Soviet charges that the West seeks information on its force levels without being willing to commit itself to reductions or to use inflated intelligence figures to pursue unfair advantage; (ii) if rejected by the Soviets, place them on the record as opposing verification; and (iii) if accepted, permit resolution of the data dispute through actual observation, while (iv) providing the West with a means of halting the reductions process at the first indication of Soviet non-compliance.

A. Verification:

The West's full package of Associated Measures would be accepted by the East prior to treaty signature, and would be a precondition for such signature. They would be formally codified in the treaty, which would (except for postponement of data agreement and likely modification in the number of reductions phases) be the 1982 Western draft treaty.

Implementation would begin after treaty signature and before reductions, and would continue in stages during the reductions process (see C. below). Agreement on residual force levels would be required prior to each reductions tranche.

This option does not in any way diminish the effectiveness of the West's verification package. As with the current Western approach, the East would be committed by treaty to the verification measures, and would know that any impediments placed in the way of implementation would prevent all progress towards reductions. While initial implementation would precede data agreement, Western data could de facto remain the baseline, as we would be under no obligation to proceed with reductions unless we were satisfied with the results of the initial verification, and we could set our own standards for "being satisfied".

As with all MBFR options, the basic difficulty in assessing acceptability is uncertainty about ultimate Soviet willingness to countenance any agreement leading to a parity outcome. This option does, however answer Soviet charges that we seek to obtain information on their force structure without making any real commitment to reductions. We would in effect be offering

upon implementation of satisfactory verification measures leading to data agreement. Whether this would be more palatable to the Soviets than our current position is uncertain, but it could hardly be less so. At any rate, Soviet rejections of this proposal would represent a propaganda windfall for us, as it would enable us to point out that here, as in other arms control endeavours, a basic stumbling block is Soviet unwillingness to accept effective verification. The likelihood of Soviet compliance again depends ultimately upon uncertain Soviet objectives. But since satisfactory compliance would be a prerequisite for each stage of reductions, inadequate compliance would simply halt the reductions process without placing the West in a disadvantageous position, if the reductions tranches were small enough (see C.).

B. Data agreement:

Data agreement would initially be reached following treaty signature and after implementation of the West's package of Associate Measures. It would be required after each reductions tranche in order for the next tranche to occur.

This approach could be used with a variety of different units of account. Clearly, it could be used most effectively with whatever unit of account the intelligence community felt best permitted accurate monitoring and unequivocal verification.

C. Scale and Phases of Reductions:

The exact number of reductions tranches would depend largely upon two factors: intelligence community monitoring requirements, and the need for the tranches to be relatively small so that in the event of shortfall of Eastern reductions in a particular tranche (which would be exposed by subsequent verification and would stop the reductions process), the West would not be significantly disadvantaged militarily.

D. Treaty Signature:

A formal MBFR treaty setting forth the verification and reductions process described above, and incorporating the other aspects of the Western draft treaty of 1982, would be signed in Vienna and ratified by the Senate. (Given their experiences with SALT II, the Soviets are highly unlikely to accept anything short of ratification.) Signature would be followed by verification, data agreement, and the staged reductions process.

D. Impact on NATO's ability to respond to a crisis:

This would not differ from the impact of an MBFR agreement under the present Western position.

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A. Consultations with the Allies:

We would seek initial trilateral agreement on the acceptability of this approach (the UK will doubtless regard it as overadventurous, the FRG as overconservative, but we might be able to get each to agree to this middle position to guard against something "worse" from their perspectives). If such agreement was forthcoming, we could either move directly to introduce the proposal in NATO, or carry out bilateral explorations with the Soviets and further trilateral evaluations of their response (see B) prior to discussion in the Alliance.

B. Bilateral and Multilateral Channels:

The relative emphasis given to a bilateral or multilateral channels would depend upon the basic aims of our move. If the principal goal was to give a high public profile to our desire for progress in MBFR while forcing the Soviets to go on record as opposing verification, we would want to move the proposal quickly to the multilateral channel. If we placed a higher value on seeking Soviet acceptance of this proposal, and initial soundings indicated genuine Soviet interest in it, we would wish to continue with more extensive and explicit bilateral contacts before going public.

C. Likely Soviet Response:

As mentioned above, it is impossible to ascertain accurately the degree of Soviet interest this proposal would generate, given our uncertainty as to what the Soviet bottom line for an MBFR agreement is. Any interest that was present would (as with other options) presumably be communicated bilaterally. The East could be expected to respond to a formal Western tabling of a proposal along these lines by a statement highlighting its supposed inequities and calling for the West to agree to the current Eastern proposals.

D. Implications for INF, CDE

INF deployments will certainly have taken place long before this or any MBFR proposal could bear visible fruit. The potential usefulness of this move for smoothing the progress of continued deployments by highlighting Western commitment to arms control would clearly depend in part on how much intensity the INF issue continued to generate following initial deployments. Even if INF continues to be a contentious issue, however, it is unlikely that any move in a non-nuclear and relatively forgotten arms control endeavour such as MBFR would have much countervailing effect.

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**OPTION 3: POSTPONEMENT OF DATA AGREEMENT UNTIL
AFTER INITIAL U.S.-SOVIET REDUCTIONS**

Description

The sides would negotiate an interim agreement of limited duration covering: initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, a freeze period during which force data/information would be exchanged and verified to the satisfaction of both sides, and a declaration of intent to sign a formal treaty on reductions to parity on the basis of the verified (agreed) data. Details of the verification measures to be implemented at each stage would be agreed.

This interim agreement would include the following points:

1. Initial US/Soviet reductions would be completed within one year. The US would withdraw 13,000 and the Soviets 30,000. The US and USSR would exchange lists of the units/personnel to be withdrawn. Exit/entry points would be established for U.S.-Soviet forces.

2. Following completion of these initial reductions, the sides would agree not to increase the collective level of their military manpower in the area of reductions for a period of 18 months.

A. At the beginning of this period, the sides would provide information on their forces existing in the area according to the following format: (this would be AM-6, i.e., information and data on structure down to battalion/regiment level, including numerical strengths of units).

B. At the beginning of this period, the sides would also put into effect the following verification measures: permanent exit/entry points with observers (AM-5); on-site inspections (AM-4); prior notification of military movements into area (AM-3). The consultative commission would also be established.

C. The sides would have 18 months to confirm, through the AMs and national means, that the data/information provided under AM-6 was accurate. Questions could be raised in the consultative commission.

D. If, at the end of this 18-month period, the sides were satisfied that the information provided by each side was accurate, the sides would sign and ratify a formal treaty covering reductions to parity within three years. All AMs would be in effect during the three years and for the duration of the treaty. The amount of each side's reductions would be specified in the treaty based on the force data agreed at the end of the freeze period.

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A. If, at the end of that 18-month period, either side (through procedures agreed by the consultative commission) declared itself not satisfied that the information provided was accurate, all obligations would be voided.

3. The sides would continue to work out the details of the treaty on reductions to parity during the 30-month duration of this interim agreement.

Treaty Signature and Other Modalities

The understanding described above would be worked out by the delegations and would provide the basis for an interim agreement. There is flexibility on the actual form of the interim agreement. An executive agreement of limited duration (30 months), signed by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State of all direct participants, might be appropriate. The interim agreement would go into effect upon signature.

If the sides agreed to proceed with reductions to parity, that agreement would be a formal treaty to be ratified according to the constitutional procedures of each state. Signature could be by Foreign Ministers or Heads of State.

Scale and Phases of Reductions

After the initial understanding is signed:

-- The U.S. would withdraw 13,000 troops and the USSR would withdraw 30,000 troops. Withdrawals would be completed within one year.

-- After these reductions, neither side would increase the collective level of its military manpower. This freeze period would last 18 months.

If, after this 30-month period, the sides decide to sign the treaty, then, after treaty ratification:

-- The sides would take the specified amounts of reductions leading to the establishment of the agreed common collective ceilings. These reductions would be completed within three years.

Verification Measures

The verification measures to accompany each of the reduction steps would be specified in the interim agreement. Thus, before any reductions were taken, the sides would agree that:

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required for Western acceptance of the treaty, it must be presumed that the East generally intends to comply with their legal obligations.

During the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions phase and the freeze period, it might be argued that the East would have less incentive to comply since the obligations undertaken would not be in treaty form. They might be willing to take greater risks at marginal cheating. However, since the interim agreement is of limited duration, the East might consider the risk of detection too great. There is a risk that the East will not provide accurate data/information under AM-6, but that risk exists with the current Western draft treaty and its requirement for agreed data prior to reductions. It could be argued that the risks were less under this Option 3 since we would not have to abrogate a treaty in the event of Eastern non-compliance. There is inherently some risk of Eastern cheating, but large-scale cheating or misreporting should be ascertainable, especially since this option provides an 18-month verification period.

Data Agreement

The interim agreement would specify that, at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would exchange information on their forces in the area at that time, according to an agreed format. That format (Associated Measure 6) would be described in the interim agreement. The sides would then have 18 months to check out the accuracy of the information provided.

The enhanced Associated Measure 6 provides that information would be given on force structure down to battalion level, and would include numerical strengths of the units. Thus, instead of data agreement solely on the basis of aggregate totals of manpower as under our current draft treaty, data agreement would be based on force structure which is more compatible with our own national means of monitoring Eastern forces. Also, unlike our current draft treaty where we are essentially demanding Eastern agreement to our current data, under Option 3 and the enhanced Associated Measure 6, we would be determining the accuracy or non-accuracy of the specific information provided by the East under Associated Measure 6.

Possible Negotiating Strategy

Consultations with Allies

If this option were selected, we would first call a U.S.-U.K.-FRG trilateral meeting to coordinate positions. Such a meeting could be held in December; alternatively, the three could reach agreement on the margins of the December 8-9 NATO Ministerial. Although the FRG prefers minimal linkage among the three steps and wanted a NATO initiative phrased in terms of statements of principle rather than as a new proposal for an agreement as this option is

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-- For the initial U.S.-Soviet withdrawals: the U.S. and USSR would exchange lists of the forces to be withdrawn; exit/entry points would be established through which all withdrawals and all U.S. and Soviet forces entering would pass; non-interference with NTM. These verification measures would be in effect for the 12-month duration of the withdrawal stage. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to verify the withdrawals and to monitor U.S. and Soviet force levels).

-- For the freeze period: at the beginning of the freeze period, the sides would provide the information of its forces existing in the area according to the previously agreed format, and the following verification measures would go into effect: exit/entry points, on-site inspection, prior notification of movements into area. These verification measures would last for the 18-month duration of the freeze period. (Comment: The purposes of the verification measures would be to confirm the data/information provided and to confirm/ update our data base for Eastern forces).

-- For reductions to parity: If the treaty is signed, all verification measures would go into effect upon ratification and would continue for the duration of the treaty. (Comment: The purpose of the verification measures would be to monitor and verify reductions and maintenance of the common collective ceilings.)

Assessment of effectiveness. For the freeze period and for reductions to parity under the treaty, if signed, the effectiveness of the verification measures would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

For the initial U.S.-Soviet reductions, the measures noted would be adequate to confirm the withdrawals and to keep track of U.S.-Soviet force movements for the purpose of monitoring U.S. and Soviet force levels. The absence of on-site inspection for this period, of one year would have only marginal effect on our ability to monitor the obligations undertaken.

Likelihood of Soviet acceptance/compliance. The likelihood of the East accepting Western verification measures would be somewhat enhanced under this option (compared to the current Western draft treaty) since the West would have met the East part way on the reductions issues of Eastern interest. However, given the requirement for data agreement (and its presumption of large asymmetrical reductions) prior to the treaty on reductions to parity, it remains unlikely that the East would accept this Option as is.

For the treaty on reductions to parity, the likelihood of Soviet compliance with obligations would be the same as for the current Western draft treaty. It can be expected that the East will take a very narrow interpretation of their obligations and that there will be disputes. However, if the East did agree to the data agreement

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now structured, they would probably support this option without significant change. The U.K. prefers not to make any initiative on data and would prefer their own option if a data initiative were deemed desirable. The U.K. would resist this option, but if the U.S. and FRG were to insist on it, the U.K. would probably acquiesce but would probably suggest changes.

Once the U.S., U.K. and FRG agreed to a coordinated position, we would introduce this option into NATO for Allied approval. Most of our Allies support making a data initiative, so there would probably be little difficulty in gaining Allied acceptance. If the option were introduced into NATO by the end of this year, guidance to the Ad Hoc Group could probably be agreed in time to table the initiative at the beginning of next round, which begins January 26.

Multilateral and Bilateral Channels

A primary purpose of Option 3 is to neutralize Eastern pressure on reductions issues so that we can engage in detailed discussion of data/verification. We should pursue this objective both in the formal negotiations and in bilateral channels.

If this option were selected, we should not let the current negotiating round end without bilateral contact. We want the Soviets to continue to give attention to verification issues during the recess. We should therefore indicate that we will have a constructive response to their February/June proposals next round and that we then expect them to be prepared to engage in detailed discussion of verification. Once the initiative is tabled in Vienna, we would pursue such discussions with the Soviets, primarily in Vienna, with the objective of pressing the East to accept the substance as well as the principle of our verification measures.

In the formal negotiations, we may want to establish working groups to work on associated measures and reductions issues, which would permit us to manage the interface between the bilateral and multilateral channel by directing formal Allied discussions on verification issues, thus ensuring that the bilateral channel does not get too far ahead of the Allies.

Likely Soviet Response

Despite the fact that this option would not meet several important Soviet interests (it does not accept mutual example cuts; it retains the requirement for agreed data at a later stage), the Soviets would welcome the data move as a step in the right direction. The Soviets will probably attempt to use Western interest in discussion of verification issues as leverage to gain Western concessions on reductions issues, e.g., on armaments.

Nevertheless, it would seem that the Soviets would agree to more detailed discussion of data/verification issues. They have

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alr Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/09 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000300140015-1 tion further if the West would respond to their overall proposals. The fact that the Soviet Military Representative has, apparently, taken personal initiative in furthering our data/verification discussions indicates that such Soviet statements have at least some backing in the Soviet Defense Ministry and thus some potential for development.

Where such discussion might lead is uncertain: probably not to an agreement, since we would still face the problem of asymmetrical reductions even if the Soviets were to make further concessions on verification. But detailed discussions of data/verification, especially on our enhanced Associated Measure 6, could only be useful to us.

Impact on INF, CDE

If the Soviets walk out of INF, our Allies will probably be anxious to step up activity in other arms control forums, including (and perhaps especially) MBFR, to underline the fact that the West remains flexible on arms control. In any case, INF discussions will probably be resumed sometime next year, one way or another, and the Allies will continue to be concerned that the overall Western negotiating posture be positive and credible. A Western MBFR initiative along the lines of this option would meet these interests.

It is in the U.S. interest to keep CDE focused on confidence-building measures and to avoid discussion of force reductions in that 35-nation forum. MBFR remains the only forum we have for addressing force reductions as an Alliance and in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context. Even those of our Allies who share our view that MBFR is the preferred forum for force reductions equally want to ensure that such discussions remain active in one forum or another. Continued stalemate in MBFR will encourage our Allies to look to CDE for that purpose. This option would spark useful activity in MBFR and would bolster NATO's public posture on arms control.

Impact on NATO's Ability to Respond to Crisis

NATO military studies of the Western 1979 package of associated measures concluded that the package could assist NATO political decision-making in time of crisis, since a violation of an associated measure would add to NATO's warning indicators and information about Warsaw Pact intentions. The alert activity exception to Associated Measure One, and the Western requirements for negotiated exceptions to the common ceiling were designed to protect NATO mobilization/reinforcement capability in a crisis.

This option does not change the substance of the Western package of associated measures (it does delay implementation of on-site inspection and exchange of information for one year) or the Western position on alert activities or exceptions. Therefore, the assessment of this option's impact on NATO's ability to respond in a crisis should be the same as for the current Western draft treaty.

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The development of the relationship between MRRP and GPR
will be monitored and controlled carefully regardless
of whether this option is chosen or the current Western
position is maintained. Choice of this option would not alter
the current framework of that issue.

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Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Col (P) John Stanford
Executive Secretary
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United States
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